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The recent global food shortage hit with little warning and plunged an extra 75 million people 
into poverty and food insecurity (FAO 2008a). The reasons for this food crisis varied from 
country to country, but everywhere it was accompanied by high food prices, steadily rising 
since 2000. The impact of these escalated prices became most visible during late 2007 when 
the price of corn rose by 31 percent, rice by 74 percent, soya by 87 percent and wheat  by a 
massive 130 percent in a single year, March 2007-March 2008 (UNDP 2008). In the case of 
wheat, the price of a ton of the commodity climbed from US $105 in January 2000, to $167 in 
January 2006, to $481 in March 2008. 
The maximum brunt of this price hike was borne by developing and least developed countries. 
According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in Côte d’Ivoire the price of rice 
more than doubled in March 2008 from what it was a year earlier. In Senegal, by February 
2008 the price of wheat had reached a level twice as high as it was in February 2007. In the 
Philippines, a major rice-producing country, the cost of rice increased by 50 percent during 
2008. In Sri Lanka, the price of rice doubled between March 2007 and March 2008, and in 
Bangladesh, another major producer of rice, it increased by 66 percent in the same period  
(FAO 2008b). 
High international food prices posed two direct problems in 2007 and 2008: the world’s poor 
found they could no longer afford to buy food and the governments of developing countries 
saw their popularity plunge because of food insecurity. Many of these governments were 
facing fuel and fiscal crises before the food crisis hit and they found themselves in a difficult 
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situation; they had to choose whether to put their scarce fiscal resources toward alleviating 
the fuel crisis or the food crisis.
But the severity of the food crisis in ‘apparently’ food self-sufficient countries — such as 
Pakistan, Indonesia, India and Egypt — showed that food security could be as much an issue 
of food access and availability (that is, socio-economic access to food) as it is an issue of food 
production. Even if food production in these countries should not have been an issue, the 
absence of good governance ensured that food did not 
reach all sections of society at a uniform price. 
In order to understand this nexus between food 
insecurity and governance, Pakistan may offer a classic 
case study. Despite a bumper crop of wheat in 2006-07 
(23.3 million metric tonnes), the prices of wheat flour in 
Pakistan doubled in the next fiscal year. So, what went 
wrong? And what does the Pakistan case study offer us in 
terms of lessons for how to deal with future food crises in 
developing countries? 
understanding the Global Price Hike 
Before delving into the specific case of Pakistan, let us look at the usual reasons given for why 
prices of food soared in the international marketplace in the first place. Some of the reported 
reasons for recent global food crisis include: 
Weather and climate-related disruptions in crop production: Initial reasons for the food price 
hike that started in late 2006 included several distinct weather-and-climate-related incidents 
that caused disruptions in crop production in major grain producing nations. Perhaps the most 
influential event was the extended drought in Australia that caused the annual rice harvest 
to fall by as much as 98 percent from pre-drought levels. Likewise, the Australian production 
of wheat — which previously could be up to 25 million tons in a good year (most of it being 
available for export) — dropped to 9.8 million tons in 2006 (The New York Times, 2008).  
Floods in South Africa, another major grain exporter, also affected the global food exportable 
surplus (Suleri 2008) and cyclone Nargis in Myanmar had adverse effect on rice exports. 
The FAO had previously estimated that Myanmar would export up to 600,000 tons of rice 
in 2008. But during the first three quarters of 2008-09, the country was only able to export 
150,000 tons of rice (People’s Daily Online, 2009).
Stock levels: The gradual reduction in the level of grain stocks, mainly cereals, since the mid-
1990s, is another supply side factor that presumably is one of the major contributors to recent 
food crisis. Indeed, since the previous high-price event in 1995, global stock levels have declined, 
on average, by 3.4 percent per year as demand growth has outstripped supply. Production 
shocks at recent low stock levels helped set the stage for rapid price hikes (FAO, 2008a). 
Food stock levels have been affected by changes in structures and functioning of food markets 
in the WTO regime, as well as reforms prescribed by international financial institutions. The 
role of the state is being minimized in maintaining buffer stocks by factors including: the 
phasing out of state and para-state trading bodies; controlling food trade through tariffs and 
duties; restricting inter- and intra-country movement of food stocks; and rationing of food 
commodities . These factors in major food producing countries, coupled with the high cost 
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of storage and increased competition with emerging food exporting countries, led to reduced 
stock levels (SDPD-UNDP, 2009).
Indeed, there is a statistically significant negative relationship between the stocks-to-use ratio 
(the ratio of stocks at the beginning of the season to utilization during the season) and the 
average cereal prices during the same season. This means that tight markets at the global level 
at the beginning of the season tend to put upward pressure on prices. As stocks reach very 
low levels, the absence of buffer supplies means that prices may rise precipitously under either 
a demand or supply shock (FAO, 2008a). 
Rising oil prices: The third major trigger for the food price hike was reported to be the rise 
in oil prices from $22-28 per barrel in 2005 to $140 a barrel by July 2008. This dramatic rise 
increased the price of fertilizers, raised the cost of food transport and increased the input cost 
of energy-dependent intensive agriculture to such an extent that farming became a financially 
non-viable option for many subsistence and small farming families who were forced to leave 
their farms and work as unskilled laborers in nearby towns and cities. 
Biofuels: Besides this direct impact, the rising cost of oil had an unintended consequence: 
it diverted a major chunk of global grain production to biofuels. Once oil prices topped 
$60 a barrel, biofuels became more competitive, creating a direct competition between 
grains for food and grains for cheaper fuel. As a 
result, approximately 100 million tons of grain 
was redirected in 2007-08 from food to fuel (total 
worldwide grain production for 2007 was just 
over 2000 million tons.). As farmers in developed 
countries devoted larger parts of their crops to fuel 
production compared to previous years, land and 
resources available for food production decreased 
correspondingly. As a result, less food became 
available for human consumption, especially in 
developing and least developed countries.  
Increasing demand by rising middle-class of India and China: Some analysts and political 
leaders, including former American President George W. Bush, blamed an increasing demand 
for a more varied diet (especially meat, one kilogram of beef requires seven kilograms of feed 
grain) across the expanding middle-class populations of China and India as the major cause 
of the global food crisis. Diversion from starches and carbohydrates to animal protein would 
result in an increased import of feed grains. However, figures from FAO don’t support this 
argument. Since 1980, the imports of cereals in India and China have been trending down, 
on average by four percent per year, from an average of 14.4 million tonnes in the early 1980s 
to 6.3 million tonnes over the past three years. The FAO figures further reveal that food 
utilization growth in China and India was much slower compared to the rest of the world, 
indicating no major influence of rising middle-class — and their so-called changing diets — on 
the supply and prices of food.
The American commodity speculation: Speculation on the prices of commodities in major 
American stock exchanges also had a worldwide impact on food’s pricing mechanisms.  
Financial speculators, smelling the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the US and seeking quick 
returns on their money and that of their clients, shifted billions of dollars from equities and 
mortgage bonds and invested them into buying the futures in food and raw materials. This 
www.bu.edu/pardee
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gave a shot in the arm to the prices of commodities across the globe, at a time when they were 
already in short supply. 
All of the above mentioned factors, coupled with falling world food stockpiles, contributed to 
the dramatic worldwide rise in food prices during 2006 through 2008. 
It is worth noting that growth in population has had hardly any effect on the food crises. In 
fact, growth in global food production has been greater than population growth worldwide 
even in lean harvest years. As a result, food availability per person, which increased 
dramatically between 1961 and 2005, has not changed in the 2006-2008 timeframe.
There were, however, some other contributing factors that made things worse once the 
price of food rose. Panic hoarding, speculative buying, and export controls levied by food-
producing countries to try and preserve food for their own people were the most significant of 
these factors. The net result was less food was available to be exported to countries which rely 
on food imports, leading to further price hikes.
food security-Governance nexus: The Case of Pakistan
As mentioned earlier, Pakistan had produced enough wheat (its staple diet) in 2006-07 that 
could satisfy all its domestic needs for that year, but still the country experienced one of the 
worst food inflations (32.3 percent), the highest in the last 30 years (Government of Pakistan, 
2008). The price of wheat and wheat flour nearly doubled during 2007-08 resulting in food 
riots in certain parts of Pakistan. Even today food inflation is in double digits, standing at 29.8 
percent for the period July 2008-January 2009 (Government of Pakistan, 2009). 
www.bu.edu/pardee
food Price Index february 2000 – february 2009
Several factors led to a dramatic spike in global food prices from 2006 to 2008.
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It is amazing that Pakistan was the sixth largest wheat producer and among the top ten wheat 
exporters in 2006-07 (Daily Times, 2008). The country was the ninth largest wheat exporter 
with a share of 1.5 percent in global wheat exports (China with a share of 2.3 percent was 
the eighth largest wheat exporter, whereas Ukraine with a share of 1.4 percent is the tenth 
largest exporter). With a ‘bumper’ wheat crop in Pakistan, should the fall in Australian wheat 
production have affected Pakistan’s domestic market? The answer is “no”. What about 
increased use of maize for production of biofuels in the US? Could it affect Pakistan’s wheat 
price? The link is neither visible nor convincing as maize is not one of the staple foods in 
Pakistan. The rise in the price of oil is a real challenge, and Pakistan’s economy — like that of 
all other countries —  was adversely affected during 
recent fuel price hikes. Still, this historic high fuel 
price does not seem to be a limiting factor for wheat 
production during 2007. 
In trying to understand the reasons behind Pakistan’s 
food crisis, we should remember the refrain from 
Nobel prize-winning economist and former Pardee 
Visiting Professor Amartya Sen: “There is no such 
thing as an apolitical food problem.” While external 
factors and events may trigger food crisis, it is political 
action or inaction that determines its severity, and 
often even whether or not a famine will occur. 
For example, look at the political actions leading to the wheat crisis in Pakistan. After 
calculating its domestic requirements (around 19.5 million metric tonnes), the Government of 
Pakistan decided to allow export of 1.5 million tonnes of wheat at US $225-232 per tonne in 
April and May 2007. Very soon, however, Pakistan started facing shortages of wheat and the 
government had to import one million tonnes of wheat in December 2007 at US$ 380-400 
per tonne, exclusive of transportation costs. The shortage of wheat and subsequent import 
at higher price resulted in wheat hoarding, panic buying and further hoarding. However, even 
this phenomenon does not clearly reveal the fate of the bumper wheat in Pakistan.
The question arises: where did all the wheat go? In the absence of effective social safety 
nets, the Government of Pakistan subsidizes wheat flour through procurement of wheat at 
a pre-announced price and then supplies it to wheat flour mills at a subsidized price. During 
2007, the world price of raw wheat (exclusive of transportation cost and in bulk purchases) 
was almost US$ 4 per 10 kilograms (kg). The Pakistan government had set the retail price of 
milled wheat at US $2.6 per 10 kg. Such large difference between the domestic prices and the 
international ones led to massive smuggling of wheat to Afghanistan, which has always been 
dependent on the wheat supply from Pakistan. In that particular year, its dependence further 
increased as Afghanistan’s domestic wheat production suffered badly in 2007 due to an 
extended dry season. 
But even the smuggling cannot account for the whole of the problem. As mentioned earlier, 
the government agencies procure part of wheat from farmers after the harvest and then 
supply it to flour mills on subsidized prices during the rest of the year. The procurement price, 
if announced before the sowing season, helps farmers make an informed decision about their 
future cropping plan and may serve as an incentive for more production. 
Like any other year, the Punjab Food Department (the department responsible for maintaining 
wheat reserves in Punjab province, ‘the bread basket’ of Pakistan) started issuing subsidized 
www.bu.edu/pardee
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wheat to flour mills at rupees (Rs.) 480 (US $8) per 40 kg from 15th September 2007. By 
that time, flour millers as well the food department had the information that minimum 
procurement price for the next crop would be more than Rs. 480 per 40 kg. In actual terms, 
the government announced that the minimum procurement price for wheat to be procured 
from April 2008 would be Rs. 510 (US $ 8.5) per 40 kg; this price was subsequently raised to 
Rs. 625 (US$ 10.41) per 40 kg in February 2008.
One needs not be a genius to guess that flour millers would have made a fortune by buying 
subsidized wheat and selling it back to the Food Department without milling it in a matter 
of just months. It was almost Rs. 350 (US$ 5.9) per bag of 100 kg that they earned in the 
process.  
While various government agencies were claiming that they were releasing subsidized wheat 
to flour mills, a large part of that wheat was not being milled into wheat flour. Again, a large 
chunk of what was getting milled was being smuggled to Afghanistan.  
The situation got worse after the assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 
December 2007. Her assassination was followed by a surge of public protests and political 
riots leading to disruption (and in many cases suspension) of intercity public and goods 
transportation for many days. This further intensified the crisis. 
averting future Crises
It is important to note that higher food prices have powerful distributional effects; they hurt 
the poorest people the most. This is true both among countries and within countries. Food 
inflation led to riots not only in Pakistan but also in Haiti, Cameroon, Indonesia, Burkina 
Faso, Philippines and Egypt. The exact nature of the domestic triggers differ by country, but in 
each case national mal-governance was a confounding factor. 
At the international level, global aid and bilateral agencies were trying to play their role but 
were faced with resource constraints. At the national level, the governments did try to meet 
the demand-supply deficit either through imports, through putting a ban on food exports, 
www.bu.edu/pardee
Global and regional per capita food consumption (kcal per capita per day)
region 1964–66 1974–76 1984–86 1997–99 2015 2030
World 2358 2435 2655 2803 2940 3050
Developing countries 2054 2152 2450 2681 2850 2980
Near East and North Africa 2290 2591 2953 3006 3090 3170
Sub-Saharan Africa1 2058 2079 2057 2195 2360 2540
Latin America and the Caribbean 2393 2546 2689 2824 2980 3140
East Asia 1957 2105 2559 2921 3060 3190
South Asia 2017 1986 2205 2403 2700 2900
Industrialized countries 2947 3065 3206 3380 3440 3500
Transition countries 3222 3385 3379 2906 3060 3180
1Excludes South Africa
Source: FAO, 2002
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through food aid, or by providing subsidized food through various public social safety nets, 
all with limited or nominal success. Apart from resource constraints at global level, there was 
another factor behind failure of international responses to food crisis: international responses 
work only when countries are able to meet their governance pre-requisites. Global governance 
institutions cannot always overcome the challenges offered by national governance 
institutions, and certainly not when it comes to socio-economic access to food. 
Proponents of market driven development were of the view that 
high international food prices would become an opportunity, 
at least for food producing countries such as India, Pakistan, 
Indonesia, and Egypt who could have transferred, in theory, 
high food prices to local markets benefiting their farmers 
thus reducing the rural poverty. But partly due to governance 
problems, most of the farmers in the developing countries could 
not benefit from this opportunity. The rest of their failure can 
be explained in terms of the high cost of production or the lack 
of timely access to inputs — again issues that need to be tackled 
through effective governance. 
It may not be easy for developing countries to put their own 
governance systems in order in the short and medium term, 
but in the long term it is imperative. Immediate actions on managing food crises as they arise 
are necessary, but they can never be sufficient in and of themselves unless the problems of 
mal-governance are tackled. Doing so will also have multiple societal benefits since good 
governance breeds less crises, not only in food availability but for a whole range of other 
social and economic needs. 
Global food crises are ‘global’ because they happen across countries and in enough countries 
to merit that label. However, the solution to these crises has to combine global food 
governance with national, and sometimes sub-national, food governance. The key lies in the 
realization that food is not simply a supply problem but also an access problem. Therefore, 
the solution to food challenges lies not only in improving supply, but in improving access. And 
that requires better food governance at all relevant levels: global, national, sub-national.
Here is the lesson that the world in general and countries like Pakistan in particular should 
draw from the soaring food prices: improve national food governance in the short run and 
sustain it in the medium and long term; and make long-term investment in the food supply 
chain at all levels. After all, it is the political action or inaction that determines whether a 
famine will occur or not. •
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